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Abstract. The popularity of social media platforms such as Twitter
has led to the proliferation of automated bots, creating both opportu-
nities and challenges in information dissemination, user engagements,
and quality of services. Past works on proﬁling bots had been focused
largely on malicious bots, with the assumption that these bots should be
removed. In this work, however, we ﬁnd many bots that are benign, and
propose a new, broader categorization of bots based on their behaviors.
This includes broadcast, consumption, and spam bots. To facilitate com-
prehensive analyses of bots and how they compare to human accounts,
we develop a systematic proﬁling framework that includes a rich set of
features and classiﬁer bank. We conduct extensive experiments to evalu-
ate the performances of diﬀerent classiﬁers under varying time windows,
identify the key features of bots, and infer about bots in a larger Twitter
population. Our analysis encompasses more than 159K bot and human
(non-bot) accounts in Twitter. The results provide interesting insights
on the behavioral traits of both benign and malicious bots.
Keywords: Bot proﬁling · Classiﬁcation · Feature extraction · Social
media
1 Introduction
In recent years, we have seen a dramatic growth of people’s activities taking place
in social media. Twitter, for example, has evolved from a personal microblogging
site to a news and information dissemination platform. The openness of the
Twitter platform, however, has made it easy for a user to set up an automated
social program called bot, to post tweets on his/her behalf.
The proliferation of bots has both good and bad consequences [4,8]. On the
one hand, bots can generate benign, informative tweets (e.g., news and blog
updates), which enhance information dissemination. Bots can also be helpful
for the account owners, e.g., bots that aggregate contents from various sources
based on the owners’ interests. On the other hand, spammers may exploit bots to
attract regular accounts as their followers, enabling them to hijack search engine
results or trending topics, disseminate unsolicited messages, and entice users to
visit malicious sites [8,10,11]. In addition to deteriorating user experience and
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trust, malicious bots may cause more severe impacts, e.g., creating panic during
emergencies, biasing political views, or damaging corporate reputation [8,21].
It is thus important to characterize diﬀerent types of bots and understand
how they compare with human users. Recent studies have shown the importance
of proﬁling bots in social media [1,2,4,8,10–13,17,18,20,21], but these works
have focused mainly on malicious (e.g., spam) bots, failing to account for other
types of benign bots. With the rise of new services and intelligent apps in Twitter,
benign bots are increasingly becoming prominent as well.
Comprehensive proﬁling of both malicious and benign bots would oﬀer several
major beneﬁts. In information dissemination and retrieval, knowing the activity
traits of both bot types and the nature of their tweet contents can improve
search and recommendation services by separating tweets of bots from those
of humans, returning more relevant, personalized search results, and promoting
certain products/services more eﬀectively. For social science research, a more
accurate understanding of human interactions and information diﬀusion patterns
[8,9] can also be obtained by ﬁltering out activity biases generated by bots. In
turn, these would beneﬁt the overall user community as well.
Fig. 1. Examples of broadcast, consumption and spam bots in Twitter
To illustrate the usefulness of proﬁling bots, consider the examples in Fig. 1,
of diﬀerent types of benign and malicious bots (which we further describe in
Sect. 3). The ﬁrst example is a user who utilizes the IFTTT service1 to gather
contents from diverse sources for her own consumption. Knowing that she uses a
consumption bot, Twitter can provide a new service to organize the unstructured
contents, or recommend new contents that match her interest. The second exam-
ple involves a broadcast bot managed by a job agency to advertise job openings.
1 https://ifttt.com.
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Twitter recently introduced a new feature called promoted tweets2 and, knowing
it is a (benign) broadcast bot, Twitter can recommend the feature to help the
agency reach a wider audience. The last example shows a malicious, spam bot
that lures users to visit adult websites, posssibly containing harmful malware.
For such a bot, Twitter may develop a strategy to demote—or even ﬁlter out—its
posts, so that the followers do not see them on their tweet streams.
Contributions. In this paper, we present a new categorization of bots based
on long-term observations on the behaviors of various automated accounts in
Twitter. To our best knowledge, this work is the ﬁrst extensive study on both
benign and malicious Twitter bots, with detailed analyses on both their static
and dynamic patterns of activity. In recent years, Twitter bots have evolved
rapidly, and so our work also provides a more timely study that oﬀers updated
insights on the bot characteristics. Our ﬁndings should also beneﬁt social science
and network mining researches. We summarize our key contributions below:
– We propose a new categorization of Twitter bots based on their behavioral
traits. In contrast to past studies that focus largely on malicious bots, our
study encompasses more detailed examinations of both malicious and benign
bots, as well as how they compare to human accounts. For this, we have studied
a large dataset of more than 159K Twitter accounts, out of which we have
manually labeled 1.6K bot and human accounts.
– To facilitate comprehensive analyses on bots, we develop a systematic pro-
ﬁling framework that includes a rich set of numeric, categorical, and series
features. This enables us to examine both the static and dynamic patterns of
bots, which span various user proﬁle, tweet, and follow network entities. Our
framework also features a classiﬁer bank that includes prominent classiﬁcation
algorithms, thus allowing us to comprehensively evaluate various algorithms
so as to identify the best approach for bot proﬁling.
– We carry out extensive empirical studies to evaluate the performance of our
classiﬁers under diﬀerent time windows and to identify the most relevant,
discriminating features that characterize both benign and malicious bots. We
also conduct a novel study to assess the generalization ability of our method
on unseen, unlabeled Twitter accounts, based on which we infer the behavioral
traits of bots in a larger Twitter population.
2 Background and Related Work
A number of studies have been conducted to identify and proﬁle bots in social
media. To detect spam bots, Wang [21] utilized content- and graph-based fea-
tures, derived from the tweet posts and follow network connectivity respectively.
Chu et al. [4] investigated whether a Twitter account is a human, bot, or cyborg.
Here a bot was deﬁned as an aggresive or spammy automated account, while
cyborg refers to a bot-assisted human or human-assisted bot. Diﬀerent from our
2 https://business.twitter.com/solutions/promoted-tweets.
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work, the bots deﬁned in [4] are more of malicious nature, and the study did not
provide further categorization/analysis of benign and malicious bots in Twitter.
To investigate on spam bots, Stringhini et al. [17] created honey proﬁles on
Facebook, Twitter and MySpace. By analyzing the collected data, they identiﬁed
anomalous accounts who contacted the honey proﬁles and devised features for
detecting spam bots. Going further, Lee et al. [13] conducted a 7-month study
on Twitter by creating 60 social honeypots that try to lure “content polluters”
(a.k.a. spam bots). Users who follow or message two or more honeypot accounts
are automatically assumed to be content polluters. There are also related works
on spam bot detection based on social proximity [10] or both social and con-
tent proximities [11]. Tavares and Faisal [19] distinguished between personal,
managed, and bot accounts in Twitter, according to their tweet time intervals.
Ferrara et al. [8] built a web application to test if a Twitter account behaves
like a bot or human. They used the list of bots and human accounts identiﬁed
by [13], and collected their tweets and follow network information. This study,
however, covers only malicious bots. Dickerson et al. [5] used network, linguistic,
and application-oriented features to distinguish between bots and humans in
the 2014 Indian election. Abokhodair et al. [1] studied on a network of bots
that collectively tweet about the 2012 Syrian civil war. This study covers both
malicious (e.g., phishing) and benign (e.g., testimonial) bots. In contrast to our
work, however, their ﬁndings are tailored to a speciﬁc event (i.e., the civil war)
and may not be applicable to other bot types in a larger Twitter population.
There are also studies aiming to quantify the susceptibility of social media
users to the inﬂuence of bots [2,12,20]. By embedding their bots into the Face-
book network, Boshmaf et al. [2] demonstrated that users are vulnerable to
phishing (e.g., exposing their phone number or address). The susceptibility of
users is also evident in Twitter [12,20]. Freitas et al. [9] tried to reverse-engineer
the inﬁltration strategies of malicious Twitter bots in order to understand their
functioning. Most recently, Subrahmanian et al. [18] reported the winning solu-
tions of the DARPA Twitter Bot Detection Challenge. Again, however, all these
studies deal mainly with malicious bots and ignore benign bots.
3 New Categorization of Bots
We deﬁne a bot as a Twitter account that generates contents and interacts with
other users automatically—at least according to human judgment. Our deﬁnition
thus includes both benign and malicious bots. Based on long-term observations
on Twitter data, we propose to categorize Twitter bots into three main types:
– Broadcast bot. This bot aims at disseminating information to general audi-
ence by providing, e.g., benign links to news, blogs or sites. Such bot is often
managed by an organization or a group of people (e.g., bloggers).
– Consumption bot. The main purpose of this bot is to aggregate contents
from various sources and/or provide update services (e.g., horoscope reading,
weather update) for personal consumption or use.
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Fig. 2. Bot and human accounts in Twitter
– Spam bot. This type of bots posts malicious contents (e.g., to trick people by
hijacking certain account or redirecting them to malicious sites), or promotes
harmless but invalid/irrelevant contents aggressively.
Figure 2 illustrates the three bot types, where the arrow direction represents the
ﬂow of information. It is worth noting that our proposed categorization is more
general than the taxonomy put forward in [15], which covers mainly malicious
bots. Our categorization is also general enough to cater for new, emerging types
of bot (e.g., chatbots can be viewed as a special type of broadcast bots).
4 Dataset
Data collection. Our study involves a Twitter dataset generated by users in
Singapore and collected from 1 January to 30 April 2014 via the Twitter REST
and streaming APIs3. Starting from popular seed users (i.e., users having many
followers), we crawled their follow, retweet, and user mention links. We then
added those followers/followees, retweet sources, and mentioned users who state
Singapore in their proﬁle location. With this, we have a total of 159,724 accounts.
Table 1. Distribution of our Twitter dataset
Labeled data Unlabeled data
Consumption bot Broadcast bot Spam bot Human account
313 171 105 1,024 158,111
Total no. of labeled data=1,613; Total no. of data=159,724
To identify bots, we ﬁrst checked active accounts who tweeted at least 15
times within the month of April 2014. We then manually labeled these accounts
and found 589 bots. As many more human users are expected in the Twitter pop-
ulation, we randomly sampled the remaining accounts, manually checked them,
and identiﬁed 1,024 human accounts. In total, we have 1,613 labeled accounts,
3 https://dev.twitter.com/overview/.
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Fig. 3. Statistics of humans and bots in our labeled Twitter data
as summarized in Table 1. The labeling was done by four volunteers, who were
carefully instructed on the deﬁnitions in Sect. 3. The volunteers agree on more
than 90% of the labels, and any labeling diﬀerences in the remaining accounts
are resolved by consensus. Also, if an account exhibits both human and bot
characteristics, we determine the label based on the majority posting patterns.
Exploratory analysis. We conducted a preliminary study on our 1,613 labeled
data to get a glimpse of the activity patterns of bots as well as human
accounts. Figure 3(a) shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of
several key attributes. An early increase in CDF value means a more skewed
distribution. We focus on key attributes that reﬂect a user’s social and post-
ing patterns: popularity = |F ||E|+|F | , follow ratio =
|E|
|F | , reciprocity =
|E∩F |
|E∪F | ,
retweet unique ratio = |R||T | , url unique ratio =
|U |
|T | , mention unique ratio =
|M |
|T | , hashtag unique ratio =
|H|
|T | , where E, F , R, T , U , M , H are the set of fol-
lowees, followers, retweets, tweets, URLs, user mentions, and hashtags for a given
account, respectively. We also deﬁne readership = retweeted|T | , where retweeted is
the number of times a user’s tweets get retweeted (by others). Figure 3(b) shows
heatmaps of tweet counts |T | for diﬀerent days and hours over 4months.
How do humans compare with bots and how do bots diﬀer from one another?
The popularity, follow ratio, and reciprocity results in Fig. 3(a) suggest that
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bots (except for consumption bots) generally have more followers than followees,
but are less reciprocal (i.e., follow each other) than humans. Based on the
retweet unique ratio and readership results, humans are more likely to reshare
contents from others and have their contents reshared than bots, respectively.
Similarly, the mention unique ratio result suggests that humans are more likely
to mention (i.e., talk to) others than bots. Meanwhile, the url unique ratio
and hashtag unique ratio results show the bots tend to include more diverse
web links and topics than humans, respectively. Finally, comparisons among the
three bot types show that broadcast bots are the most popular and post the
most diverse URLs and hashtags, but they are the least reciprocal and rarely
mention others. A plausible reason is that broadcast bots are typically used by
organizations solely for information dissemination, and not for interaction with
others.
How do activities of humans and bots change over time? Figure 3(b) shows that
seasonality exists in the tweet activities of human and bot accounts4. That is,
humans seldom tweet in early morning (from 2am to 7am) and post moderately
from 7am to 8pm. Afterwards, their tweet traﬃc increases signiﬁcantly between
8pm and midnight, suggesting that Singapore users are more active after dinner
time and before they sleep. Meanwhile, consumption bots tweet more actively
than humans from 3am to 7am (i.e., sleep hours), but are less active from 9am to
3pm (i.e., busy working/school hours). Also, consumption bots are less active in
the weekends than in the weekdays. While broadcast bots have generally similar
patterns to consumption bots, the former is less active during sleep hours (3am–
7am) whereas the latter during busy hours (9am–3pm). We can attribute this to
the intuition that broadcast bots aim to reach a wider audience during their non-
sleep hours. Lastly, unlike broadcast and consumption bots, spam bots are active
all days/hours, and they exhibit very random timings. In summary, diﬀerent bots
serve diﬀerent purposes and their temporal signatures reﬂect these.
5 Profiling Framework
We develop a systematic proﬁling framework to facilitate comprehensive analyses
of bots. Below we describe each component of the framework in turn.
Database. Our framework takes as input three types of database: proﬁle, tweet,
and follow databases. The proﬁle database contains user information such as
the Twitter user id, screenname, location, and proﬁle description. The tweet
database contains all the tweets posted by diﬀerent users, which may include
various entities such as hashtags, URLs, user mentions, videos/images, retweet
information, and tweet sources/devices. We collectively refer to these as tweet
entities. Finally, the follow database contains the snapshots of users’ relationship
network over time, which include both followers and followees of the users at
diﬀerent time periods. We collectively call these follow entities.
4
The exceptionally low tweet frequencies in the first week of January and 12-14 February are due
to major downtime of our servers.
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Feature extraction. This component serves to construct a feature vector that
represents a Twitter account. It takes three types of feature: numeric, categorical,
and series. We describe the extraction steps for each type below:
– For numeric features, we perform standarization by scaling each feature to a
unit range [0, 1]. This would allow us to mitigate feature scaling issues, partic-
ularly for classiﬁcation methods that rely on some distance metric. Examples
of numeric features are count and ratio attributes (see Table 2).
– For categorical features, we ﬁrst select the top K categories based on their
frequencies in each data point, and then ﬁlter out the remaining categories.
Next, we perform one-hot encoding by transforming the top K categories into
a binary vector with K elements. For example, a categorical attribute with
four possible values: “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D” is encoded as [1, 0, 0, 0], [0, 1, 0, 0],
[0, 0, 1, 0], and [0, 0, 0, 1], respectively.
– For series features, we ﬁrst count the frequency of every (discrete) number
in the series. For instance, given a series [a, a, b, a, c, b, c, a, b], we can compute
the histogram bins: (a, 4), (b, 3), (c, 2). To ensure a moderate feature size, we
keep only top 100 bins with the highest count frequencies. Subsequently, we
normalize the frequencies such that they sum to 1, thus forming a probability
distribution. For the previous histogram bins (a, 4), (b, 3), (c, 2), the normal-
ization will result in (a, 49 ), (b,
3
9 ), (c,
2
9 ).
Classifier bank. Finaly, to learn the association between the extracted features
and diﬀerent bot types (or human), our framework includes a classiﬁer bank that
comprises a rich collection of classiﬁcation algorithms. In our study, we employ
four prominent classiﬁers: na¨ıve Bayes (NB) [6], random forest (RF) [3], and
two instances of generalized linear model, i.e., support vector machine (SVM)
and logistic regression (LR) [7]. These algorithms represent the state-of-the-art
methods previously used for (malicious) bot classiﬁcation. For instance, RF was
utilized in [4,5,8,13], while SVM and NB were used in [5,21].
6 Feature Engineering
We have crafted a rich set of features based on the feature extraction component
in our bot proﬁling framework. Our feature set consists of three groups: tweet,
follow and proﬁle features. For tweet features, we also distinguish between sta-
tic (i.e., time-independent) and dynamic (i.e., time-dependent) tweet features.
Table 2 provides a listing of all the features used in our empirical study.
Static tweet features. We generate static tweet features based on the combi-
nation of entities and statistical metrics, as shown in Table 2. For instance, to
generate the hashtag features of a user, we treat each hashtag as a “bag” and
count how many times the word occurs in all of x’s tweets. This yields a bag-
of-hashtag vector, from which we can compute ﬁrst-order statistics (i.e., count,
unique count, mean, median, min, and max) as well as second-order metrics
(i.e., standard deviation (std) and Shannon entropy [16] (entropy)). We note
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Table 2. List of features used in our bot classiﬁcation task
Group Entity Features
Static tweet features Tweet word Count (N), unique count (N), unique ratio (N), basic stats (N)
Retweet Retweeted (N), readership (N), count (N), unique count (N),
ratio (N), unique ratio (N), basic stats (N)
Hashtag Count (N), unique count (N), ratio (N), unique ratio (N),
basic stats (N)
Mention Count (N), unique count (N), ratio (N), unique ratio (N),
basic stats (N)
Url Count (N), unique count (N), ratio (N), unique ratio (N),
basic stats (N)
Media Count (N), unique count (N), ratio (N), unique ratio (N),
basic stats (N)
Source Sources (S)
Dynamic tweet features Tweet Hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S),
extended stats (N)
Retweet Hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S),
extended stats (N)
Hashtag Hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S),
extended stats (N)
Mention Hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S),
extended stats (N)
Url Hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S),
extended stats (N)
Media Hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S),
extended stats (N)
Follow features Followees count basic stats (N)
Followers count Basic stats (N)
Mutual count Basic stats (N)
Reciprocity Basic stats (N)
In reciprocity Basic stats (N)
Out reciprocity Basic stats (N)
Popularity Basic stats (N)
Follow ratio Basic stats (N)
Proﬁle features Proﬁle Is geo enabled (C), lang (C), time zone (C), account age (N),
favourites count (N), listed count (N), statuses count (N),
utc oﬀset (N)
Basic stats: set of statistical metrics {mean, median, min, max, std, entropy}
Extended stats: Cartesian product of {timegap, hour, day, weekday, timeofday} and basic stats
N: numeric feature, C: categorical feature, S: series feature
that the second-order metrics serve to quantify the diversity of the entities. We
also compute the ratio = count|T | and unique ratio =
unique count
|T | , where |T | is
the total number of tweets posted by a user. For the retweet entity, we addition-
ally consider retweeted and readership features, as described in Sect. 4. Finally,
we consider a series feature to represent the source entity, whereby each source
maps to a histogram bin containing the normalized frequency of the source.
Dynamic tweet features. For these features (cf. Table 2), we introduce addi-
tional time dimensions that capture the dynamics of tweet activities, namely:
hours ∈ {0, . . . , 23}, days ∈ {1, . . . , 31}, weekdays ∈ {Monday, . . . , Sunday},
timeofdays ∈ {morning (4am–12pm), afternoon (12pm–5pm), evening (5pm–
8pm), night (8pm–4am)}, and timegaps. The timegap dimension refers to the gap
(in milliseconds) between two consecutive entity timestamps, e.g., for N tweets
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posted by a user x, we can compute a timegap vector with length (N − 1). For
each time dimension, we can then generate the series features based on the his-
togram binning described in Sect. 5, as well as compute the statistical metrics
such as mean, median, min, max, std and entropy.
Follow features. These features are derived by computing metrics that summa-
rize snapshots of the follow network at diﬀerent time points (cf. Table 2). Let E
and F be the set of followees and followers of a given user. In turn, we compute
the followees count = |E|, followers count = |F |, mutual count = |E ∩ F |.
as well as ratio metrics such as reciprocity = |E∩F ||E∪F | , in reciprocity =
|E∩F |
|F | ,
out reciprocity = |E∩F ||E| , popularity =
|F |
|E|+|F | , and follow ratio =
|E|
|F | . We
calculate these metrics for every snapshot of the follow network at a given
time point, and then compute the statistics mean, median, min, max, std and
entropy to summarize the metrics over all time points.
Profile features. Finally, we also consider several basic user proﬁle features, as
per Table 2. Here, account age refers to the lapse between the time a user ﬁrst
joined Twitter and the current reference time. Further details on the deﬁnitions
of the other proﬁle features can be found in https://dev.twitter.com/.
7 Results and Findings
This section elaborates our empirical study on bots. We ﬁrst describe our exper-
iment setup, and then address several research questions in Sects. 7.1–7.3.
Evaluation metrics. To evaluate our classiﬁers, we utilize three metrics pop-
ularly used in information retrieval [14]: Precision, Recall and F1. We report,
for each class c ∈ {broadcast, consumption, spam, human}, the Precision(c) =
TP (c)
TP (c)+FP (c) , Recall =
TP (c)
TP (c)+FN(c) , and F1 (c) =
2Precision(c)Recall(c)
Precision(c)+Recall(c) , where
TP (c), FP (c) and FN(c) are the true positives, false positives, and false
negatives respectively. Based on these, we also report the macro-averaged
Precision = 14
∑4
c=1 Precision(c), Recall =
1
4
∑4
c=1 Recall(c), and F1 =
1
4
∑4
c=1 F1 (c).
Experiment protocols. In this work, we consider two sets of experiment:
– Experiment E1: This set of experiment involves evaluation on our 1,613
labeled data (see Table 1). For this evaluation, we use a stratiﬁed 10-fold cross-
validation (CV), whereby we split the labeled data into 10 mutually exclusive
groups, each retaining the class proportion as per the original data. This strat-
iﬁcation serves to ensure that each fold is a good representative of the whole,
i.e., it retains the (unbalanced) class distribution as in the original data. For
each CV iteration f , we then use group f (10%) for testing and the remain-
ing groups f ′ = f (90%) for training. We report the results averaged over 10
iterations, which include Precision(c), Recall(c) and F1(c) for each class c,
as well as the macro-averaged Precision, Recall and F1.
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– Experiment E2: This set of experiment serves to evaluate predictions on
the remaining 158,111 unlabeled data (see again Table 1). Based on this, we
can infer the behavioral traits of bots in a larger Twitter population. For this
experiment, we are unable to compute Recall, as we would have to manually
verify one by one a large number of unlabeled data. Instead, we evaluate based
on Precision at top K for each class (K  158, 111).
Model parameters. We conﬁgured our classiﬁer bank as follows: For the NB
classiﬁer, we use the smoothing parameter α = 1. For RF, we use N = 100
decision trees. Finally, for SVM and LR, we set the cost parameter C = 1
and class weight =“balanced”; the latter is for automatically handling the
imbalanced class distribution. We performed grid search to determine all these
parameters, which give the optimal performances for each classiﬁer. In particular,
we varied the NB parameter from the range α ∈ {0.1, 1, 10}. For RF, we tried
N ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 100}, and for SVM and LR, we tried C ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100}.
Significance test. Finally, we use Wilcoxon signed-rank test [22] to test for the
statistical signiﬁcance of our results. When comparing between two performance
vectors, we look at the p-value at a signiﬁcance level of 0.01. If the p-value is less
than 0.01, we say that the performance diﬀerence is indeed signiﬁcant.
7.1 How Well Can the Classifiers Predict for Bots?
To answer this research question, we ﬁrst conduct a sensitivity study by varying
the time duration for which features (cf. Table 2) are generated. For this study,
we use the CV procedure on our labeled data (i.e., Experiment E1), whereby
the classiﬁers were trained using all features listed in Table 2. Figure 4 shows the
macro-averaged Precision, Recall, and F1 over 10 CV folds, with the duration
varied from 1week, 2weeks and 1month to 2months and 4months (up to 30
April 2014). Based on the F1 results, we can conclude that 2weeks is the best
duration and that LR outperforms the other classiﬁers. In this case, RF gives
higher Precision than LR, but its Recall is much lower, and so is its F1. It
is also shown that a tradeoﬀ exists in choosing the duration; an overly short
duration degrades the performance, which can be attributed to data scarcity.
The same goes for an overly long duration, due to inclusion of outdated data.
Table 3 shows further breakdown of the CV results for the best time duration
(i.e., 2weeks). Overall, LR and SVM give the best results, and outperform the
more complex RF and simpler NB methods (except for Precision of the “spam”
class). For spam bots, RF yields higher Precision, but much lower Recall and
F1 than LR and SVM. While SVM and LR perform very similarly, we decided
to use LR as our main classiﬁer for two reasons: (i) LR outputs more meaningful
probabilitic scores than the unbounded decision scores in SVM; and (ii) LR is
more robust than SVM against variation in time duration, as we saw in Fig. 4.
Based on the individual Precision(c), Recall(c) and F1(c) of each class c, we
can conclude that, among the bots, consumption bots are the easiest to detect,
followed by broadcast and spam bots. This is expected, owing to the imbalanced
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Fig. 4. Classiﬁcation results for varying durations
Table 3. Breakdown of 10-fold cross-validation results using 2-week training data
Metric Method Class label Macro average
Broadcast Consumption Spam Human
Precision NB 0.6519 (−) 0.7206 (−) 0.7069 (+) 0.9929 0.7681 (−)
RF 0.5880 (−) 0.9462 0.8636 (+) 0.9750 (−) 0.8432 (+)
SVM 0.6952 0.9278 0.6574 (−) 0.9961 0.8191
LR 0.6798 0.9366 0.6869 0.9942 0.8244
Recall NB 0.6901 (−) 0.8818 (+) 0.3905 (−) 0.9609(−) 0.7308 (−)
RF 0.8596 (+) 0.8435 0.3619 (−) 0.9902 0.7638 (−)
SVM 0.7602(−) 0.8626 0.6762 (+) 0.9990 0.8245
LR 0.8070 0.8498 0.6476 0.9971 0.8254
F1-score NB 0.6705 (−) 0.7931 (−) 0.5031 (−) 0.9767 (−) 0.7358 (−)
RF 0.6983 (−) 0.8919 0.5101 (−) 0.9826 (−) 0.7707 (−)
SVM 0.7263 0.8940 0.6667 0.9976 0.8211
LR 0.7380 0.8911 0.6667 0.9956 0.8228
NB: na¨ive Bayes, SVM: support vector machine, LR: logistic regression, RF: random forest
(−): significantly worse than LR at 0.01, (+): significantly better than LR at 0.01
class distribution as per Table 1. We can also compare the results of our classiﬁers
with that of a random guess5. Based on the statistics in Table 1, the expected
F1 scores of a random guess for broadcast bot, consumption bot, spam bot, and
human classes are 10.6%, 19.40%, 6.51% and 63.49%, respectively. Our four
classiﬁers thus outperform the random guess baseline by a large margin.
For spam bots, several studies [4,8,13] have reported high classiﬁcation accu-
racies, while our results are modest by comparison, largely due to the lack of
spam bot accounts in our data. However, it must be noted that these works
focused largely on distinguishing between (malicious) bots vs. other accounts,
whereas our study deals with a much more challenging and ﬁne-grained catego-
rization of broadcast, consumption and spam bots. Also, the lack of spam bots
in our data can be attributed to several factors, such as our relatively strict def-
inition of spam bot (whereby the majority of its postings need to have malicious
5
Random guess w.r.t. a class c refers to a classifier that assigns a proportion pc% of the instances to
class c, and (1−pc)% to classes other than c. In this case, Precision(c) = Recall(c) = F1(c) = pc,
where pc =
P (c)
P (c)+N(c) =
TP (c)+FN(c)
TP (c)+FN(c)+T N(c)+FP (c) .
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or irrelevant contents), or our data collection process that begins with popular
seed users and their connections (thus possibly missing unpopular spam bots).
Nevertheless, our main focus is to analyze benign bots, which has been largely
ignored in the past studies. Further studies on less prominent spam bots that
post malicious contents at a sparse rate is beyond the scope of our current study.
7.2 Which Features Are the Most Indicative of Each Bot Type?
In light of this research question, we trained our best classiﬁer (i.e., LR) using
all 1,613 labeled data, and look at the weight coeﬃcients wi,c of each class in the
trained LR. Here we use the raw weights wi,c instead of the absolute values |wi,c|
or squared values w2i,c, as the raw weights allow us to distingush between features
that correlate positively with a class label (which are our main interest) and
those that correlate negatively. Figure 5 shows the top 15 positively-correlated
features for each class. In general, we ﬁnd that the top features are dominated by
the source (i.e., where the tweets come from) and entropy-based dynamic tweet
features. Below we elaborate our feature analysis for each class further.
Fig. 5. Top discriminative features for each label in bot classiﬁcation task
Broadcast bots. Among the top features for broadcast bots, certain sources
that are popularly used for blogging (such as WordPress and Twitterfeed) or
brand management (such as HootSuite) are found to be highly indicative. It is
also shown that the entropy-based features for the url entity correlate strongly
with broadcast bots. Recall from Sect. 6 that entropy is a second-order metric
that quantiﬁes how diverse a distribution is. Accordingly, as broadcast bots gen-
erally aim to disseminate information about certain sites/brands, we can expect
that they would have more concentrated url distribution (i.e., low entropy). We
will further verify this in Sect. 7.3. Figure 5 also suggests that certain critical
timings of the url postings are highly indicative of broadcast bots.
Consumption bots. From Fig. 5, we ﬁrstly ﬁnd that the top three sources for
consumption bots (i.e., Unfollowers, Twittascope, and Buﬀer) are service apps
that allow users to track their followers/followees status, horoscope readings,
and scheduled postings, respectively. Secondly, we discover that the diversity
(entropy) of tweet postings is a strong indicator for consumption bots. Lastly,
Fig. 5 shows that certain timezones and timings (weekday and day) of the hashtag
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and url activities constitute yet another important set of indicators. All these led
us to conclude that consumption bots post tweets in a way that follows certain
timings/schedules. We will further analyze this in Sect. 7.3.
Spam bots. The result in Fig. 5 suggests that there are certain sources that can
be exploited by spammers to post irrelevant or unsolicited tweets. For example,
TwittBot is an application that allows multiple users (and thus spammers) to
post to a single Twitter account. In addition, the timing diversities of the url,
mention, tweet and hashtag activities are found to be the key signatures of spam
bots. As also shown in Fig. 3(b) (of Sect. 4), the temporal patterns of spam bots
are highly irregular. Altogether, these suggest that spam bots have highly diverse
timings (i.e., high entropy), which we will again verify in Sect. 7.3.
Humans. The top three features in Fig. 5 suggest that human accounts typ-
ically use credible sources such as “web” (i.e., Twitter website) and the oﬃ-
cial Twitter mobile apps. Next, the account age and isGeoEnabled features
suggest that human accounts have lived relatively long in Twitter and usually
have his/her tweets’ location enabled, respectively. Also, high timing diversity
(entropy) of the tweet, retweet and mention activities are indicative of human
accounts, although it is not as high as that of spam bots. Again, Sect. 7.3 ana-
lyzes this further. Lastly, the media median and media mean features suggest
that human accounts like to attach media ﬁles (e.g., photos) in their tweets.
7.3 What Can We Tell About Bots in a Larger Twitter Population?
To address this question, we performed Experiment E2 by deploying our trained
LR classiﬁer to predict for the unlabeled 158, 111 accounts. We then picked the
top K accounts with the highest probability scores for each class, and manually
assessed the class assignments of these accounts. The assessment results can be
found in AppendixA (Table 4). We found that the prediction results generally
match well with our manual judgments. Based on this, we can make inference on
the behavior of bots in a larger Twitter population, i.e., the entire population of
Singapore Twitter users. We focus our analyses on the entropy-based dynamic
tweet features, which dominate the top features as shown in Fig. 5. That is, we
analyze the entropy distributions of the tweet, retweet, mention, hashtag and
url activities. The complete distributions can be found in AppendixA (Fig. 6),
which reveals several interesting insights as elaborated below.
Tweet patterns. We ﬁrst compared the distributions of the tweet timings, and
discovered that consumption and spam bots exhibit higher diversity (entropy)
than that of humans. In contrast, broadcast bots were found to have more con-
centrated timings. These suggest that broadcast bots post tweets at more speciﬁc
timings than humans and other types of bots. We also found that consumption
and spam bots are very similar in terms of daily timings (i.e., weekday and
day entropies), but the former is less diverse than the latter in terms of hourly
timings. We can thus conclude that consumption and spam bots tweet equally
regularly on a daily basis, but the latter tend to post at random hours.
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Retweet and mention patterns. Retweet and mention activities can be used
to gauge how much a bot (or human) cares about other accounts. Comparing
the distributions of the retweet and mention timings in Fig. 6, we can see again
that spam bots have the most random patterns compared to humans and other
bot types. But unlike the results for tweet timings, consumption bots have the
lowest diversity in terms of daily and hourly timings for the retweet and mention
activities. This suggests that consumption bots reshare contents and mention
other users at more speciﬁc timings, respectively. Such regularity makes sense,
especially for consumption bots that provide update services to their users, e.g.,
Unfollowers and Twittascope (cf. Sect. 7.2).
Hashtag patterns. In Twitter, a hashtag can be viewed as representing a
topic of interest. As shown in Fig. 6, humans and consumptions bots have very
similar diversities of hashtag timings. It is also shown that spam bots have the
most diverse hashtag timings (as expected), whereas broadcast bots exhibit very
focused hashtag timings. The latter suggests that broadcast bots tend to talk
about diﬀerent topics at more regular time intervals. This is intuitive, espe-
cially if we consider the nature of the account owners of broadcast bots (e.g.,
news/blogger sites), which aim to disseminate various information on a regular
basis.
URL patterns. For the URL timings, we ﬁnd that in general humans and
broadcast bots use URLs at more speciﬁc timings than consumption and spam
bots. Interestingly, however, we observe that consumption bots exhibit higher
diversity in daily timings than spam bots, but the reverse is true for hourly
timings. This suggests that consumption bots use URLs on a more regular daily
basis than spam bots, but the latter post URLs at more random hours.
Comparisons. It is also interesting to see how our results in Figs. 5 and 6
put little emphasis on the importance of the follow network features in the
classiﬁcation task. This is diﬀerent from previous studies on (malicious) bots
[4,5,13,17,20], whereby the follow features play a key role. We can attribute
this to the evolution of bot activities as well as stricter regulations imposed by
Twitter (especially for spam bots). Also, to our best knowledge, no attempt has
been made in the previous works to infer on a larger population. Thus, our work
oﬀers more comprehensive insights on the behavioral traits of bots.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new categorization of bots, and develop a systematic
bot proﬁling framework with a rich set of features and classiﬁcation methods.
We have carried out extensive empirical studies to analyze on broadcast, con-
sumption and spam bots, as well as how they compare with regular human
accounts. We discovered that the diversities of timing patterns for posting activ-
ities (i.e., tweet, retweet, mention, hashtag and url) constitute the key features
to eﬀectively identify the behavioral traits of diﬀerent bot types.
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This study hopefully will beneﬁt social science studies and help create better
user services. In the future, we plan to examine the prevalence of our ﬁndings
across multiple countries, beyond our current Singapore data. We also wish to
study information diﬀusion and user interaction in Twitter with the aid of bots.
Acknowledgments. This research is supported by the National Research Founda-
tion, Prime Ministers Oﬃce, Singapore under its International Research Centres in
Singapore Funding Initiative.
A Predictions on Unlabeled Twitter Accounts
To facilitate our study on a larger Twitter population, we ﬁrst examined how
well our best classﬁer (i.e., LR) can predict for unlabeled data that it never
sees in the (labeled) CV data. Table 4 summarizes the top K prediction results,
whereby we varied K from 10 to 50 to verify the robustness of the predictions.
For each class, we computed the number of correctly predicted instances (TP )
as well as precision at top K, i.e., Precision = TPK .
Table 4. Top K predictions on unlabeled 158,111 Twitter accounts
Label K = 10 K = 20 K = 30 K = 40 K = 50
TP Precision TP Precision TP Precision TP Precision TP Precision
Broadcast bot 9 0.80 18 0.90 27 0.90 34 0.85 38 0.76
Consumption bot 10 1.00 20 1.00 30 1.00 38 0.95 48 0.96
Spam bot 4 0.40 9 0.45 12 0.43 19 0.475 23 0.48
Human 10 1.00 20 1.00 30 1.00 40 1.00 40 1.00
TP: number of true positives
As shown in Table 4, our LR classiﬁer produces fairly accurate and consistent
predictions across diﬀerent K values. With respect to human accounts, our LR
classiﬁer achieved perfect Precision for all K values. Unsurprisingly, we can
expect that human accounts constitute the largest proportion of the Twitter
population, and thus they should be the easiest to classify. We also obtained good
results for the broadcast and consumption bots, with precision scores greater
than 75% and 95% respectively. On the other hand, we observe rather modest
Precision scores for spam bots (i.e., 40–47.5%). We can attribute this to the
insuﬃcient number of instances for spam bots, which form only 1051,613 = 6.51%
of our labeled data (cf. Table 1). This may (again) be due to our data collection
procedure that involved popular users as seeds and/or due to our relatively strict
criteria for the characterization of spam bot accounts (cf. Sect. 7.1). Nevertheless,
the Precision scores of 40–47.5% remain relatively good, if we compare with
that of a random guess for our labeled data (i.e., 6.51%).
All in all, we ﬁnd our top K predictions on unlabeled data to be satisfactory.
Based on this, we can use our predictions to infer the behavioral proﬁles of bots in
a larger Twitter population, which in this case spans the overall Singapore users.
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Fig. 6. Distribution of entropy-based features for 158,111 Twitter accounts
In particular, we analyze the entropy-based dynamic tweet features, namely the
entropy distributions of the tweet, retweet, mention, hashtag and url activities,
which constitute the majority group of the top discriminative features in Fig. 5.
Figure 6 presents the cumulative distribution functions of these features. The
detailed analysis of the distributions can be found in Sect. 7.3.
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